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NEVADA: YOU'RE NOT GETTING
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Kevin Beck*
"Most essentially, federal and state courts are complementary systems for
administering justice in our Nation. Cooperation and comity, not competition
and conflict, are essential to the federal design. A State's dignitary interest
bears consideration when a district court exercises discretion in a case of this
order."' This passage penned by Justice Ginsberg recognizes the need for
cooperation and comity between state and federal courts. These ideals are
deeply imperiled when a federal court exercises its equitable discretion to
enjoin ongoing state proceedings. 2 The Supreme Court sought to protect the
state judiciary from unnecessary federal court intervention in Younger v. Har-
ris.3 However, the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Morros
4
threatens to significantly limit the application of Younger on the basis of party
status.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ("NWPA"),
which set a schedule for the eventual construction of a national nuclear waste
repository.5 Although the NWPA originally provided that the Secretary of
Energy would recommend three potential sites to the President, Congress
amended the act in 1987 to designate Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole
location to be considered for site characterization.6 Since the 1987 amendment,
Nevada citizens, public and private entities, and politicians have adamantly
opposed the site characterization at Yucca Mountain.7 Nevada's resistance to
* J.D., William S. Boyd School, of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas (2003). 1 would
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choosing this topic and preparing this piece for publication. I am also thankful for Belinda,
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Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999).
2 See David Mason, Slogan or Substance? Understanding 'Our Federalism' and Younger
Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 852, 867-68 (1988) (asserting that Our Federalism's "chief
tenet" is the avoidance of interfering with the states' legislative process whenever possible).
3 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
4 268 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2001).
5 Id. at 697. The NWPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000).
6 Morros, 268 F.3d at 697.
7 See infra note 105 for a brief history of the published opinions dealing with Nevada's
efforts to halt site characterization activities.
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the Yucca Mountain project is evinced by a state statute that makes the storage
of nuclear waste in Nevada by any person or governmental entity unlawful.8
One of Nevada's more recent attempts to thwart the progress of the Yucca
Mountain site characterization culminated in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Morros.9 In July 1997, the United States Department of
Energy ("DOE") filed five permit applications for water appropriation with
Nevada's state engineer.' ° In response to protests lodged by several Nevada
entities, the state engineer conducted an administrative hearing on the permit
applications in November 1999."' Although the DOE claimed the water was
necessary for site characterization purposes on their applications, at the hearing
a DOE witness admitted the water would also be used for construction and
operation of the nuclear repository if Congress designated Yucca Mountain fit
for such purposes.12 Nevada law requires the state engineer to reject any per-
mit application where the proposed use "threatens to prove detrimental to the
public interest."' 3 The state engineer determined the DOE was requesting the
water for actual use in the storage of high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Moun-
tain, an activity strictly forbidden by Nevada law.' 4 He reasoned that Nevada,
by enacting the law proscribing the storage of high-level nuclear waste, has
determined that the storage of such waste is necessarily against the public inter-
est.' 5 On this basis, he denied the DOE's applications.' 6
Nevada law provides a party aggrieved by a state engineer's decision an
opportunity for judicial review in the state courts.17 Just one day before filing
its appeal in state court, the DOE brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, seeking a declaration that the Nevada statute
relied upon by the state engineer was preempted by the NWPA, an order
enjoining the state engineer to evaluate the DOE's application without refer-
ence to the Nevada statute, and a declaration that the state engineer's ruling was
"arbitrary and capricious."' 8
The federal district court, in United States v. Nevada,"' abstained from
exercising jurisdiction over the case under the Colorado River,2 ° Burford,2 '
8 NEV. REV. STAT. 459.910(1) (2001) provides: "It is unlawful for any person or govern-
mental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada."
9 268 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2001).
o Id. at 697. Applications numbered 63263-63267 were denied by the State Engineer's
Ruling 4848 on Feb. 2, 2000. The DOE's then-existing permits did not expire until April
2002. However, the DOE claimed they wanted to get an "early start" so as to avoid any
"difficulties or delays" in the permit process. United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d
1209, 1211 (D. Nev. 2000).
'' Morros, 268 F.3d at 698.
12 Id.
'3 NEV. REV. STAT. 533.370(3) (2001).
'4 Morros, 268 F.3d at 698; see infra note 105.
'5 Morros, 268 F.3d at 698.
16 Id.
'7 NEV. REV. STAT. 533.450(1) (2001).
18 Morros, 268 F.3d at 699. The complaint in the federal district court was filed March 2,
2000. The appeal of the state engineer's ruling in the state court was filed March 3, 2000.
1' 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2000).
20 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (permitting a
federal court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction based on wise judicial efficiency).
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and Pullman2 2 abstention doctrines, concluding the Nevada state court was the
appropriate forum.2 3 The court reasoned Younger 24 abstention was inapplica-
ble to the case, as it narrowly construed Younger as applying primarily to inter-
ference with criminal prosecutions.25 The United States appealed the court's
decision to abstain to the Ninth Circuit.
A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed in United States v. Morros, hold-
ing that none of the abstention doctrines applied, and remanded the case to the
district court for a ruling on the preemption issue. 26 The majority found
abstention under Younger particularly inappropriate based on the parties to the
suit, the United States and Nevada. 27 The court reasoned that policies of com-
ity and "Our Federalism" at the heart of the Younger doctrine were inapplicable
to a direct conflict between a state and the federal government. 28 The dissent,
authored by Judge Hug, championed the view that Younger abstention was
appropriate in this case, and disagreed with the majority's limitation on
Younger abstention.
29
This note examines the Ninth Circuit's decision to preclude reliance on the
Younger doctrine when the federal government asserts a claim against a state.
The analysis begins by providing a brief background of legislative and judicial
attempts to preserve comity. Part III focuses on the Younger abstention doc-
trine, both as set forth in the Younger v. Harris decision, and as expanded by
subsequent Supreme Court rulings. Part IV explains the rationale and holding
of the Morros decision. Part V presents the argument that the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Younger doctrine does not comport with the broad princi-
ples of comity and Our Federalism that form the foundation for Younger
abstention. Ultimately, the note concludes that the Ninth Circuit has unneces-
sarily restricted Younger abstention in certain instances.3 °
21 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention is appropriate when there are
difficult questions of state law; federal judicial review would interfere with the state's
attempts to establish a coherent policy to deal with issues of substantial public concern).
22 R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention appropriate when
resolution of an unsettled state law issue could eliminate or limit the need to decide a diffi-
cult federal question).
23 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1219 (D. Nev. 2000).
24 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (a federal court should abstain from interfering
with ongoing state criminal proceedings if the defendant will have an opportunity to raise
constitutional issues in that forum).
25 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1218-19. Although, in this case, the district
court claimed it was unnecessary to "expand the effect of' the Younger decision, the United
States Supreme Court has already expanded the Younger doctrine to apply outside the crimi-
nal context in Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); see discussion infra Part III.B.
26 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 709 (9th Cir. 2001).
27 Id. at 707-09. The majority reasoned that the very fact that the national government was
involved in a lawsuit against a state was sufficient to exclude the possibility of abstention
under the Younger doctrine. The primary goal of preventing federal-state controversy was
impossible at that point.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 709-12.
30 This note does not consider whether Younger abstention was appropriate in the instant
case under those arguments advanced by Judge Hug. Rather, the focus is on the inappropri-
ateness of the Ninth Circuit's decision to limit the Younger abstention doctrine.
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II. BACKGROUND
Federalism, a system by which the people are governed by two separate
and distinct governments, was the unique contribution of the Framers of the
Constitution to the realm of political theory.3 Both the legislative and judicial
branches of the national government have long recognized that comity, or
respect for the states as independent sovereigns, is an essential element of fed-
eralism. Particularly, federal respect for the state courts is evidenced in the
policies underlying the Anti-Injunction Act and judicial federalism.32
Congress, through the Anti-Injunction Act, acknowledged the indepen-
dence and importance of the state courts as early as 1793 by prohibiting federal
injunctions to stay state court proceedings.3 3 The Supreme Court has charac-
terized the Anti-Injunction Act as an effort to avoid conflict between the federal
and state courts. 34 The Act limits the resentment and hostility that state courts
would undoubtedly harbor towards their colleagues on the federal bench, were
the latter frequently to enjoin state court proceedings. 35 State court judges jus-
tifiably view such an injunction as an affront to their ability to competently
decide federal issues. The Anti-Injunction Act limits this potential for unneces-
sary friction between the state and federal judiciaries.3 6
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has sought to protect com-
ity between state and federal courts through various judicially-created absten-
tion doctrines. Abstention is premised on a federal court's voluntary refusal to
adjudicate a case or controversy that is properly within its jurisdiction, in defer-
ence to the state court's concurrent jurisdiction.37 The federal court, out of a
"scrupulous regard" for the independence of the state courts, abstains from
exercising jurisdiction over the matter.38 Including abstention under Younger,
the Supreme Court has recognized five different types of cases that justify
abstention.
39
31 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76 (1995).
32 Adam McLain, Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1555, 1591 (2001) (discussing the possibility of applying the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine as a type of abstention rather than as a concept affecting subject matter
jurisdiction).
33 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 11.2.1, at 690 (3d ed. 1999). An act of
March 2, 1793 provided that no injunctions shall be granted to stay the proceedings of any
state court. This obscure provision was largely overlooked until 1874, when it was modified
and placed in its own section. In 1948, Congress significantly revised the Anti-Injunction
Act: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
34 Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957).
35 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 691.
36 Id.
31 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 122.01[l] (3d ed. 1997)
(hereinafter MOORE ET AL.) (the abstention doctrines are judicially created limitations on
federal adjudication of cases that are rightfully within their jurisdiction to decide).
38 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (federal courts can exercise
their option to abstain only when the relief sought is equitable or discretionary).
39 See supra notes 20-22, 24; see La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
(federal court abstained in diversity case where the state law was unclear and closely associ-
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Although the Anti-Injunction Act and judicial federalism protect the state
courts' autonomy to a degree, it is not at the expense of complete federal pre-
clusion from the case. Federal interests are statutorily protected when a state
court decides a case involving a federal issue.4a A litigant may seek United
States Supreme Court review of a decision by the state's highest court when the
court was interpreting federal law. 4 Therefore, even if a state court wrongfully
interpreted federal law, ultimately the United States Supreme Court can protect
federal interests by exercising the option to review the decision.
III. THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
Younger was, in many ways, an answer to, or limiting of, the 1965 case
Dombrowski v. Pfister.4 2 Dombrowski held that a federal court could issue an
injunction to prevent state officers from prosecuting civil rights activists under
a state law so broad and vague that it unconstitutionally infringed upon their
First Amendment rights.4 3 The significance of the holding is that, in order to
obtain this injunction, the activitsts had to overcome the hurdles of the Anti-
Injunction Act, the traditional notion that a court sitting in equity will not inter-
fere with criminal prosecutions, and the established abstention doctrines.4 4 In
essence, the Dombrowski Court held that neither the Anti-Injunction Act, nor
the traditional notions of equity jurisprudence, nor established abstention doc-
trines precluded an injunction against prosecution. In the short time between
the Dombrowski decision and the Younger case, questions about the breadth of
Dombrowski were often raised, but answers from the Supreme Court were sel-
dom forthcoming. a5 However, in 1971, the much-awaited answer came.
A. Younger v. Harris
Harris was indicted in a California state court and charged with violation
of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.4 6 He filed a complaint in the fed-
eral district court seeking an order to enjoin Younger, the district attorney, from
further prosecuting him under the California statute.a7 Harris alleged the stat-
ute infringed on rights secured to him under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ated with sovereign prerogative); see also 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 37, at § 122.05[5]
(discussing the prerequisites for applying the Thibodaux abstention doctrine).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (providing for United States Supreme Court review of decisions
of a state's highest court on federal issues).
41 See 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4006 (2d ed. 1988) (hereinafter WRIGHT) (explaining that such
review is supported by the Constitution, statutes, and case law dating back to 1816).
42 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
43 Id.
' 17A WRIGHT, supra note 41, at § 4251.
45 Id.
46 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38 (1971). Criminal syndicalism was defined as "any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime,
sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any politi-
cal change." Id. at 39 n.1.
" Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.
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ments.4 8 The district court agreed, and enjoined Younger from further
prosecution of Harris under the Act.49 The California district attorney appealed
the decision to the United States Supreme Court.5 °
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the court. He noted that since
this country's beginnings, Congress had manifested the importance of permit-
ting state courts to try their cases free from federal court interference, citing
specifically to the Anti-Injunction Act and its predecessor.5 Black contended
that the primary sources for prohibiting federal intervention in state prosecu-
tions were readily apparent. 52 First was the "basic doctrine of equity jurispru-
dence."5 3 Additionally, Justice Black cited to the fundamental concepts unique
to our system of government in the following oft-quoted discourse, illuminating
the underpinnings of "Our Federalism":
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "com-
ity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
This perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many
as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our
Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the
ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism."
54
The Younger abstention doctrine was born out of the longstanding con-
cepts of comity and federalism, unique to our country. The coexistence of
state and national powers embodies a system in which there must be sensitivity
by both sovereigns to protect the other's legitimate interests.5 6 Justice Black
noted, "the National Government, anxious as it may be to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."'57 This founda-
tion creates a system that is governed by neither blind deference to state rights
nor centralized control of every important issue by the national government.
51
The Younger Court was cautious not to overturn the Dombrowski deci-
sion, but quick to limit that case to its facts. 59 The Court held that the possible
48 Id.
49 Id. at 40.
50 id.
51 Id. at 43; see supra note 33. Notably, the Court did not hold that the Anti-Injunction Act
precluded the injunction.
52 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
53 Id. A court, sitting in equity, should restrain from interfering with a criminal prosecution
when the movant has an adequate legal remedy and will not suffer irreparable harm or injury
if the equitable relief is denied.
54 Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
55 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 37, at § 122.05[i][b] (stating that the Supreme Court
based its decision on the notion of comity between the federal and state courts).
56 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
57 Id. at 44-45.
58 Id. at 44.
51 Id. at 47-49. In Dombrowski, the complaints included substantial allegations that the
prosecutions were being brought in bad faith, with no real intent to secure convictions but
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unconstitutionality of a statute on its face could not justify an injunction against
good faith attempts by state officials and courts to enforce it. 60 Younger has
become the watershed case, standing for the principle that a federal court, sub-
ject to very narrow exceptions, should not exercise its equitable jurisdiction to
interfere unnecessarily with state prosecutions.
Younger abstention is distinguished from the other abstention doctrines in
that it is premised on considerations of comity and equity jurisprudence. 6 1 A
court sitting in equity should not interfere with the ongoing proceedings of a
state criminal prosecution. 62 The Younger court expressly noted that its deci-
sion - and the creation of this new abstention doctrine - was based on notions
of comity and Our Federalism, not the Anti-Injunction Act.63
B. Younger's Progeny
The doctrine of Our Federalism is more controversial and quickly chang-
ing than any other doctrine in the federal courts.' The courts have expanded
the Younger doctrine's principles of comity, Our Federalism, and respect for
state rights far beyond the context in which they first appeared. This section
briefly highlights some of the significant extensions of the Younger doctrine.
Samuels v. Mackell was a companion case to Younger, decided on the
same day. Justice Black delivered the opinion in that case as well.65 Samuels,
based on policy concerns similar to those voiced in Younger, expanded the
Younger abstention doctrine to apply to federal declaratory relief that interferes
with state prosecutions. 66 The Court stated that a declaratory judgment will
normally "result in precisely the same interference with, and disruption of, state
proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions seeks to
avoid." 6
7
The Court, in Steffel v. Thompson, ruled that deference to the state's crimi-
nal process was required only where actual proceedings were pending in the
state court; threats of future prosecution were deemed insufficient to compel
federal court abstention.6 8 In both Younger and Samuels, the federal plaintiffs
were actually facing prosecution in the state courts. 69 Three years after these
decisions, the Court was faced with a case involving a federal plaintiff who
sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on a state's threat of arrest and
rather to harass the civil rights activists. Multiple bad-faith prosecutions establish the kind
of irreparable harm and injury necessary for a federal court injunction to issue. However,
where there is a single prosecution, brought in good faith, irreparable injury is not estab-
lished, and thus the federal court is to stay its hand.
60 Id. at 54.
61 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 37, at § 122.05[l][c] (distinguishing Younger abstention
from the Anti-Injunction Act).
62 Younger, 401 U.S. at 55-56.
63 Id. at 54 (the Court had "no occasion to consider" whether the Anti-Injunction Act
applied to the instant case); see also 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 37, at § 122.05[l][c].
6 17A WRIGHT, supra note 41, at § 4251.
65 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
66 Id. at 73.
67 Id. at 72.
68 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
69 Harris was charged with violating the Criminal Syndicalism Act and Mackell was
charged under the state anarchy statutes.
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prosecution. 70 Though the district court dismissed the case under the Younger
doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed.7 In the absence of pending state pro-
ceedings, there was no risk of federal intervention with the state's criminal
justice system, or inference that the state court is incapable of enforcing consti-
tutional principles.72
In Hicks v. Miranda, the Court elevated substance over form by requiring
the federal court to abstain under the Younger doctrine despite the fact that
plaintiff filed the case in federal court one day before becoming the defendant
in the state prosecution. 73 The Court held that the Younger doctrine should
"apply in full force" so long as the state criminal proceedings are initiated prior
to any proceedings of substance on the merits in the federal court.7 4
The Court first extended the Younger doctrine to a state civil proceeding
in Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd.75 In Huffinan, the sheriff and prosecuting attorney
sought to enforce the state's public nuisance statute by closing down a theater
that showed pornographic movies. 76 The state court, applying state law, held
that the theater was a nuisance and ordered that the theater be closed for one
year.77 Rather than appeal the state court decision, the defendant filed a case in
federal court challenging the state statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court
found the principles of comity and Our Federalism expressed in Younger mer-
ited abstention in the civil context in cases like this nuisance proceeding, where
the state civil enforcement proceedings were, according to the Court, akin to a
criminal prosecution.79 The Court was cautious to limit Huffinan's extension
of Younger to the facts; they expressly denounced having extended Younger's
applicability to all civil litigation at that time.8"
In Trainor v. Hernandez, the Court expanded upon the decision in
Huffinan by permitting Younger abstention in all civil enforcement actions
brought by the state.8 Trainor, Director of the Illinois Department of Public
Aid, sought to recover, in state court, monies from the defendants who had
fraudulently received state welfare funds.8 2 The defendants did not appear in
the state court action, but rather brought suit in federal court.83 The Trainor
Court held that the principles of comity expressed under Younger and Huffinan
are "broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing
civil enforcement action such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign
70 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 452. Steffel was threatened with prosecution under a state trespass
statute when he and a friend were handing out flyers protesting the Vietnam war at a shop-
ping center. Significantly, Steffel's friend was actually arrested and charged.
7' Id. at 475.
72 Id. at 462.
73 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975).
74 Id. at 349.
75 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
76 Id. at 595-96.
77 Id. at 598.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 604.
80 Id. at 607.
81 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
82 Id. at 435.
83 Id. at 437-38.
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capacity." 84 The Court dropped the requirement implied in Huffinan that the
civil proceedings resemble a criminal prosecution.85
The Court applied Younger principles when the state government was not
a party to the action for the first time in 1977.86 In Judice v. Vail, the defen-
dant, a class of judgment debtors, brought a federal action against the plaintiff
judges for their use of allegedly unconstitutional contempt powers.8 7 The
Court quoted from Justice Black's discourse on comity, and concluded Younger
abstention encompassed principles broad enough to extend to suits between
private parties based on the states' strong interest in the contempt process.88
Ten years later, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of Younger abstention
where the case implicates the states' interest in the enforcement of state court
judgments and orders.8 9
The Supreme Court has further required federal court abstention under
Younger when the state action is an administrative proceeding that is judicial in
nature.9" In Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, a
lawyer brought an action in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of a
rule the ethics commission accused him of violating.9 The relevant inquiry,
according to the Court, was whether the administrative proceedings, and availa-
ble review by the state court, afforded the lawyer the opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims.92 The Court established a three-prong test that has been
applied by numerous cases since Middlesex.9 3 For abstention, the Court
required that the state judicial proceedings (1) be ongoing, (2) implicate an
important state interest, and (3) provide adequate opportunity for the presenta-
tion of constitutional challenges.94
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, the
Supreme Court applied the Middlesex test in determining that Younger absten-
tion was appropriate, even though the judicial nature of the state proceedings
was not facially obvious.95 The Court distinguished a prior case wherein state
law expressly indicated that the proceedings at issue were not "judicial in
nature.'96 The Court held that, even if a constitutional issue could only be
84 Id. at 444.
85 The Court, in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989), somewhat limited the holding in Trainor v. Hernandez. That Court indicated that
there is no requirement for abstention in deference to a judicial proceeding reviewing a
legislative or executive action. Id. at 367-68. Because the Court found the underlying action
in the case to be legislative, the justices held abstention was inappropriate.
86 Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977).
87 Id. at 330.
88 Id. at 335.
89 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (reversing a district court's grant of
an injunction to enjoin the plaintiff from executing on a state court judgment).
90 Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
91 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 423.
92 Id. at 432.
93 Id.
94 Id.
9' Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 477 U.S. at 619 (the civil rights commission was investigat-
ing discrimination charges against the defendants).
96 Id. at 627 n.2 (distinguishing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
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raised via state court judicial review of the administrative proceeding, Younger
abstention was required. 7
As evinced in the above-cited cases, the Court has considerably expanded
the applicability of Younger abstention since its creation in 1971. This trend
toward expanding Younger's scope was abruptly reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's recent decision in United States v. Morros.9 8
IV. THE UNITED STATES V. MORROS DECISION
The Morros decision resulted from the DOE's attempt to obtain injunctive
and declaratory relief in the federal courts against the State of Nevada. The
district court dismissed the case based on multiple theories of abstention.99
However, the court too hastily concluded that an extension of Younger beyond
the criminal context was not warranted in the instant case. 00
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit dealt much
more extensively with the issue of Younger abstention. 1 ' The court reasoned
that the basic policy underlying Younger abstention is to "avoid unnecessary
conflict between the state and federal govemments."' °2 The majority ruled that
Younger abstention is inappropriate in situations where the United States seeks
relief against a state, or its agency, due to the impossibility of avoiding conflict
between the two sovereigns in those situations.' 03 "By the time the United
States brings suit in federal court against a state, any attempt to avoid a federal-
state conflict would be futile."' 1 4 The opinion noted that the conflict between
Nevada and the United States was particularly accentuated in this situation, as
they had been at "loggerheads" over the siting of the repository in Nevada for
over a decade.10 5 Abstention based on attempts to avoid unnecessary federal-
state conflict would be "disingenuous," considering the battles that have been
waged between Nevada and the United States on this issue."0 6 The court con-
cluded that dismissal of the case by the district court was not warranted under
97 Id. at 629.
98 268 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2001).
99 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2000). See supra, notes 20-22
for abstention doctrines applied by the district court.
'oo United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1218-19. As indicated in the preceding Part,
Younger has been formally extended by the Court beyond the criminal context.
101 Morros, 268 F.3d at 695. It is interesting that the Ninth Circuit chose to deal extensively
with the Younger doctrine in this case. Neither party, in their appellate briefs, made mention
of the Younger case, nor argued its applicability.
102 Id. at 707 (quoting United States v. Composite State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 656 F.2d
131, 136 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981)
1o3 Morros, 268 F.3d at 707.
'04 id at 708.
105 Id. The Court cited to the cases between United States and Nevada with regard to the
nuclear repository: Nevada v. Herrington, 777 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding Nevada was
entitled to federal funds to study Yucca Mountain's suitability); Nevada v. Burford, 708 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Nev. 1989) (Nevada alleged a political conspiracy to make it the unwilling
host of the repository); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Nevada's
attempt to block site characterization was preempted by the NWPA); Nevada v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 133 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding DOE's denial of funds to
Nevada for the purpose of evaluating DOE's site characterization activities was appropriate).
106 Morros, 268 F.3d at 708.
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any of the abstention doctrines, including Younger, and remanded the case for
adjudication on the merits. 107
Judge Hug dissented from the majority opinion on the grounds that
Younger abstention was applicable to the case. 118 He interpreted Younger's
respect for comity and federalism to extend specifically to the state's interest in
ongoing proceedings within their forums and for deference to the state's ability
to hear and decide constitutional claims.'0 9 The ongoing state and federal gov-
ernment controversy would not automatically render Younger inapplicable, as
concerns remain that the federal court is interfering with a state's ongoing pro-
ceedings.' I" This type of interference by the federal courts exhibited a "lack of
respect for the State as sovereign."' '' Upon determining that this case impli-
cated Younger's policy concerns, Judge Hug analyzed whether abstention was
appropriate under the three-prong test established in Middlesex'12 and Fresh
International.' 13 He determined each prong of the abstention test was satisfied
in the instant case and dissented on the ground that the district court should
have abstained under the Younger abstention doctrine.'
V. THE MORROS OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH YOUNGER'S KEY POLICIES
OF COMITY AND OUR FEDERALISM
The majority's conclusion that Younger is inapplicable in a case between
the federal government and a state improperly restricts the Younger doctrine,
undermining the doctrine's protection of the broad notions of comity and Our
Federalism.
A. Unnecessary Federal Court Interference
The United States has evinced a deep-rooted trust in the ability of state
courts to adjudicate difficult issues of federal and constitutional concern.
Among the earliest, and most obvious, illustrations of the nation's confidence
in state courts' competence is the Madisonian Compromise." 5 The Framers
were sharply divided on the issue of the constitutional establishment of inferior
107 Id. at 709.
108 Id. at 709-12.
109 Id. (quoting United States v. Ohio, 614 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1979)).
110 Id.
' I ld. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369
(1989)). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
112 Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)
(requiring (1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) that the proceedings implicate an
important state interest, and (3) that there is adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to
raise any federal constitutional challenges).
113 Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
the three-prong test from Middlesex to administrative proceedings).
''4 Morros, 268 F.3d at 712.
115 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITA-
BILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 29-30 (1999). Solimine claims that debates over parity
spring from the initial establishment of federal courts under the Constitution, providing for
one Supreme Court and other lower courts as established by Congress. The fact that the
Framers did not create lower federal courts is significant in that until Congress took affirma-
tive action to create these courts, the only forum for federal claims would be the state courts.
However, this argument is contrasted with the fact that Congress has provided for lower
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federal courts.' 16 The resolution, suggested by James Madison, was that the
inferior courts would not be created under the Constitution, rather Congress
would possess the power to establish the inferior courts at their option.' 17 This
compromise quieted the concerns of those who thought inferior federal courts
were necessary, and those who viewed them as duplicative of the then-existing
state court systems that were able to decide federal cases.' 18
As evidenced by the Madisonian Compromise, parity between state and
federal courts has been debated since the drafting of the Constitution, and con-
tinues to be a focus of modern legal scholarly debate.' Although the theoreti-
cal arguments on parity continue to rage, Congress has demonstrated
confidence in the state courts through their restrictions on federal subject matter
jurisdiction, never having permitted the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted under Article III of the Constitution.' 2 ° Although
Congress granted the federal courts general federal question jurisdiction in
1875, they also imposed an amount in controversy requirement on federal ques-
tion cases until 1980.121 Federal court jurisdiction was further limited by such
restraints as the well-pleaded complaint rule.122 State courts have historically
served as the default forum for federal claims falling outside of Congress'
restrictions on federal court jurisdiction. The state courts, bound by the
Supremacy Clause and judicial oaths to uphold the Constitution, provide an
alternative, and sometimes exclusive, forum to decide cases based on federal
laws. 123
The Supreme Court of the United States has often referred to the need to
protect the integrity of the state courts. In Douglass v. City of Jeannette,124 a




"8 Id. at 30.
19 See Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and
Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 233 (1999) (demonstrating empirical support of parity based on a single
takings case); see also Michael E. Solimine & James E. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in
Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 213 (1983) (concluding that statistical variances between state and federal court's
upholding constitutional rights were unimportant; the studies evidenced parity between the
state and federal courts); but cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role
for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 261-69 (1988) (pointing out several meth-
odological problems with the Solimine & Walker empirical comparison of federal and state
courts); see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (argu-
ing federal courts are generally more appropriate forums for federal claims because federal
judgeships are more prestigious, federal judges enjoy life tenure, and federal courts have a
tradition of protecting constitutional rights).
120 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.2, at 9 (3d ed. 1999) (although the
lower federal courts have existed since 1789, Congress has yet to grant federal courts the full
jurisdiction permitted by Article III of the Constitution).
121 Id. at 27.
122 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (requiring that the
federal issue must be present in the plaintiffs complaint; an anticipated federal defense will
not suffice to provide federal court jurisdiction).
123 MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS 30 (1999).
124 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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case predating Younger by nearly thirty years, the Court recognized that Con-
gress generally intended to allow state courts to try criminal cases without fed-
eral intervention. 125 Douglass expressed the policy that federal courts sitting in
equity should refuse "to interfere or embarrass threatened proceedings in state
courts save in [ ] exceptional cases . ...,,126 The Younger Court added, "the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."' 7 In Pennzoil v.
Texaco, the Court cautioned, "proper respect for the ability of state courts to
resolve federal questions presented in state court litigation mandates that the
federal court stay its hand."' 1 8 The federal courts must assume that the state
courts will competently decide the merits of any federal issues presented.'
29
When a federal court exercises equity jurisdiction to enjoin or interfere
with state proceedings, it implies a patent distrust of the state court's compe-
tence to decide federal issues.' 30 In doing so, the federal court tramples
beneath its feet the longstanding principles of comity, Our Federalism, and
respect for the states. The Morros opinion advocates a narrow conception of
these fundamental notions.
The Ninth Circuit's limitation of Younger abstention in cases where the
federal government and a state are adverse parties ignores the deference prop-
erly due to state courts. The court's justification for not applying the Younger
doctrine was based primarily on the fact that the state and federal government
were already involved in a drawn out controversy, thus eliminating any possi-
bility of avoiding conflict."'3 While this argument appears facially meritorious,
the court failed to recognize that Younger abstention was premised on prevent-
ing unnecessary conflicts between the federal and state judiciaries, not
intending to prevent all federal-state conflict. Problematically, the court adopts
an all-encompassing interpretation of "conflict," and narrows the traditionally
broad interpretations of comity and Our Federalism.
It is undisputed that the United States and Nevada are in conflict generally
over the siting of a nuclear repository in Nevada, and specifically over the
DOE's water rights applications. However, it does not necessarily follow that,
because the state is involved in a conflict, the state judiciary's impartiality is
necessarily compromised. The Morros court views the conflict as encompass-
ing the entirety of the state, including the judicial branch. Although issues as
monumental and controversial as the siting of a nuclear repository may cause
critics of the legal system to question the impartiality of a judge, the federal
appellate judiciary should have more confidence in their state court colleagues,
crediting them with the ability to place impartiality above an opportunity to
125 Id. at 163.
126 Id.
127 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
128 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987).
129 Ahernsfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1975); Duty Free Shop, Inc. v.
Administracion de Terrenos de Puerto Rico, 889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st Cir. 1989).
131 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 91 (1982) (noting that Younger abstention seeks to avoid the
inference that state judges are incompetent to decide federal issues).
131 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707-09 (9th. Cir. 2001).
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exercise an unfair advantage. State court judges, in fulfilling their constitu-
tional duties, are often required to enter rulings adverse to the very state that
employs them. The finding of the Morros court, that Younger abstention
would be futile where a state and the national government are parties, ignores
the fact that conflict may nonetheless be avoided between the state and federal
judiciary. 3 ' Although Morros does not directly assert that Nevada's state
court impartiality is compromised, the court's adoption of this new restriction
on Younger abstention is premised on this corrosive assumption.
The Morros court, by limiting the applicability of the Younger doctrine,
diminished the very notions of comity and Our Federalism established by the
founding fathers and long heralded by the courts. Justice Black's admonitions
that we are a "[u]nion of separate state governments," and that the national
government must seek to protect its interests in a manner that does not "unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States,"' 133 were extinguished by
allowing the Morros case to proceed in federal court. The words "unduly inter-
fere"' 134 and "avoid unnecessary conflict"'135 mandate that the federal court
exercise great restraint before interfering with a state's ongoing proceedings.
The fact that it is the United States requesting federal court relief should have
no impact on the decision to abstain. The United States, as an independent
sovereign, anxiously strives to protect her own interests, evident in the instant
case by the filing of the preemption claim in federal court.136 Our Federalism
burdens the federal judiciary with the responsibility to ensure that, in its haste
to protect federal interests, it does not unnecessarily imperil the autonomy of
the states. 1
37
The exercise of federal jurisdiction in the Morros case directly interferes
with Nevada's ongoing proceedings. The conflict between Nevada and the
United States regarding the Yucca Mountain project, though certainly real,
should not be seen as so infectious as to affect the state judiciary's impartiality.
Furthermore, limiting Younger abstention purely on the basis of the identity of
the parties to the suit is inconsistent with the underlying doctrines of comity
and Our Federalism.
B. The United States' Attempt to Change Horses Midstream
The policy of proscribing Younger abstention in conflicts between the
national government and a state, proffered in Morros, seems particularly inap-
propriate where the national government itself initiated proceedings in the state
forum. Judge Hunt, in Morros' underlying district court decision, United
States v. Nevada,' 38 noted the significance of the United States' decision to
132 Id. at 708-09.
133 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
134 Id. (emphasis added).
13- Morros, 268 F.3d at 707 (quoting United States v. Composite State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 656 F.2d 131, 136 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981)) (emphasis added).
136 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
137 David Mason, Slogan or Substance? Understanding 'Our Federalism' and Younger
Abstention, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 852, 866-67 (1988).
131 123 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. 2000).
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apply to the state engineer for the water appropriation. 139 By so doing, the
United States voluntarily subjected itself to Nevada's administrative proceed-
ings, which provide for judicial review of adverse decisions in a state court. 40
As Judge Hunt pointed out, if the United States believed it was necessarily
entitled to the water rights under the NWPA and Supremacy Clause, as it
claimed in the federal court, it could have appropriated such water without
submitting to the state's processes."'4 Only after the state engineer denied the
DOE's applications did the United States claim entitlement to the water as a
matter of right in federal court.' 4 2 Judge Hunt identified this as an attempt by
the United States to "change jurisdictional horses midstream."1 4 3
The Supreme Court has emphasized that federal restraint is necessary
when a state court is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy in ongoing pro-
ceedings. " In these situations, the Court has required that federal courts abide
by standards of restraint that far exceed those exercised in private equity juris-
prudence. "45 In Huffman v. Pursue, the Court established that Younger absten-
tion was appropriate when the federal plaintiff had failed to exhaust his state
appellate remedies.' 4 6 The Ninth Circuit has followed Huffinan's lead in
requiring a litigant to exhaust state appellate remedies."' Lower federal and
state court jurisdictions are entirely independent; a federal district court may
not act as an appellate court to an adverse state court decision. 14 8 Courts have
applied the exhaustion requirement even when the appellant believed an appeal
would be futile.' 4 9
The Court in Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n'5 ° held that the subsequent filing of a state action might require the fed-
eral court to abstain under Younger, even where the federal district court had
rightfully obtained jurisdiction over a case first.' 5 ' The decision was founded
on a similar extension of the Younger doctrine in the criminal context.' 52 The
Middlesex court found federal court abstention was warranted in both civil and
criminal contexts, provided there had been no proceedings of substance on the
merits in the federal court."'
139 Id. at 1215.
140 NEV. REV. STAT. 533.450(1) (2001).
141 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
142 Id. at 1216.
143 id.
"4 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603 (1975).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 609.
147 World Famous Drinking Emporium v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1987).
48 Dubinka v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 18 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.02[3][a] (3d ed. 1997) (describing the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, whereby a federal district court has no jurisdiction to review a
state court decision).
14' Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Administracion de Terrenos de Puerto Rico, 889 F.2d 1181,
1183 (1st Cir. 1989).
150 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
151 Id. at 436-37.
152 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (requiring the federal court to abstain based on
criminal prosecution proceedings that began subsequent to the filing of the federal case but
prior to any substantial proceedings on the merits in the federal court).
153 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 437; Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349.
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In the Morros case, the court should have resisted the attempt by the
United States to change judicial forums on two fronts. First, the United States
had not exhausted its state appellate remedies. Second, consistent with Middle-
sex, United States' subsequent filing of an appeal in the state court triggered
federal abstention. Upon the state engineer's denial of the DOE's request for
water, their appropriate remedy under Nevada law was judicial review in state
court. "'5 4 The United States opted to disregard proper procedure and filed for
declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court one day prior to filing their
appeal in state court.
155
Huffinan 156 and the other Ninth Circuit cases referenced above 157 direct
federal courts to exercise restraint in retaining jurisdiction over a case prior to
the exhaustion of state appellate remedies. Morros' permissive federal court
intervention ignores comity and respect for state courts by converting the fed-
eral district court into a court of appeals, superior to state courts. Under this
scheme, the DOE, in essence, sought and obtained federal district court review
of the state engineer's ruling.' 5 8 The United States, through its conduct, evi-
denced more trust in the state engineer's neutrality than its respect and confi-
dence in the impartiality of the Nevada judiciary.' 59  The DOE willingly
submitted to the state's administrative process for water allocation, confident
the state engineer would review the petitions fairly. However, the United
States refused to follow protocol and seek judicial review in Nevada's courts;
fearing the state judiciary's putative prejudice would be insurmountable, the
government filed its claim in federal court. This course of action showed com-
plete disdain for Nevada courts specifically, and a general distrust in the state
courts throughout the nation.
The United States' choice to file for relief in district court one day prior to
appealing the state engineer's decision was more than coincidental. It is easily
inferred that the United States was attempting to both establish federal jurisdic-
tion and still preserve an appeal in the state court in case the federal court
abstained. Regardless of the rationale underlying the decision to file an appeal,
Middlesex'6 ° compels federal abstention once the United States filed its appeal
in the state court. In the one day that elapsed between filing the claim in the
district court and filing the appeal in state court, no proceedings of substance
occurred in the federal case. 16 ' Even if a court ignored the exhaustion of state
154 NEV. REV. STAT. 533.450(1).
155 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 2001).
156 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
157 See supra notes 111-113.
158 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada has no jurisdiction to review a Nevada state court decision. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.02[3][a] (3d ed. 1997).
159 The United States' disrespect for the Nevada judiciary is evident by the fact that they
assumed the state engineer was capable of greater impartiality; judges have a formal legal
training, less partisan elections, and are subject to appellate review, up to and including
review by the United States Supreme Court on federal issues.
60 Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
161 Middlesex and Hicks both found Younger abstention appropriate when there was a lack
of proceedings of substance on the merits. United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d. 1209,
1218-19 (D. Nev. 2000).
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court remedies requirement, once the United States filed its appeal in the state
court, the core concepts of comity and Our Federalism demand the state court
be the forum for that appeal.
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to permit Younger abstention when the
national government is pitted against a state implicates two paramount policy
concerns. The first of these is the now-familiar interest in preserving the
designs of comity and Our Federalism underlying Younger abstention. A sec-
ond concern is that, under the Ninth Circuit's decision, the United States is
given two bites at the judicial apple. The federal government or its agencies,
when in controversy with any state, may, at first, acquiesce to state administra-
tive or judicial proceedings. Then, if the result in that forum proves unfavora-
ble to the United States in any manner, they may initiate litigation anew in the
federal district court. Assuming no other abstention doctrines apply, the state
and federal government could potentially be in the midst of an appeal in the
state's highest court, when the United States, fearing an adverse ruling, could
suddenly file suit in the federal district court. 162 The governments attempt to
"change jurisdictional horses midstream" and selectively re-litigate issues in
the face of an unfavorable outcome yield an absurd result.
163
C. Other Cases on Conflicts Between the United States and a State
Conflicts between the national government and individual states are an
inherent result of federalism. The Morros opinion cites three circuit court
cases as supporting the majority's decision to restrict Younger abstention." 6
However, these cases are easily distinguished from the Morros facts, and sup-
port for abstention is substantial.
1. Cases Relied Upon by the Morros Majority
The majority cites to three circuit court decisions to support the restriction
of the Younger abstention doctrine when the case involves a conflict between
the federal government and a state: United States v. Composite State Board of
Medical Examiners,165 United States v. Pennsylvania,16 6 and United States v.
Dicter.167 This section analyzes the applicability of each of these cases
individually.
Composite State Board is factually distinguished from Morros because the
United States was not permitted to intervene in the pending state court action in
Composite State Board, whereas the United States was the plaintiff in Morros.
The federal government, in Composite State Board, filed suit in district court to
162 See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (when a suit is brought in both
federal and state courts, there is a race to judgment. The case decided first would have the
effect of precluding the other case).
163 United States v. Nevada, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. Allowing the United States to change
forums implicates concerns of wasting scarce judicial resources and causing deep insult to
the dignity of state courts. Even the historic Bush v. Gore, with all of its national signifi-
cance, was permitted to proceed through the Florida state courts undisturbed before receiv-
ing federal review. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
164 United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707 (9th Cir. 2001).
165 656 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981).
166 923 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1991).
167 198 F.3d 1284 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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enjoin Georgia from suspending the license of a National Health Service physi-
cian and from regulating the service's activities.' 6 8 The United States brought
the federal action only after the state court refused its request to intervene. 1
69
Thus, but for the federal action, the United States would have been denied the
opportunity to participate in the litigation. The court made similar policy argu-
ments to those advanced in Morros about limiting Younger abstention when a
controversy between the national government and a state exists, comparing the
Anti-Injunction Act to Younger abstention.' 7 ° The court reasoned that Younger
abstention and the Anti-Injunction Act are based on similar policies of comity,
federalism, and avoiding unnecessary conflict. 7 ' Composite State Board con-
cluded that because the Supreme Court had previously found the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act inapplicable to state-federal controversies, Younger abstention was
equally inappropriate.'
72
The key distinguishing characteristic between Composite State Board and
Morros is the United States' ability to be heard in the state court action. Not
only is the United States able to be heard on their constitutional claims in Mor-
ros, it is the plaintiff in the state court action. Furthermore, Composite State
Board assumes too much in reasoning that since the Anti-Injunction Act does
not apply to the case, and its underpinnings are the same as Younger abstention,
Younger abstention is inappropriate. Younger abstention is clearly broader
than the Anti-Injunction Act. The court in Younger v. Harris specifically rec-
ognized the existence of the Anti-Injunction Act, but based its decision to
abstain on the broader notions of comity and Our Federalism, forming the foun-
dation of the doctrine. 173 If the Anti-Injunction Act paralleled Younger absten-
tion in its application, the Younger doctrine would have fizzled long ago as a
meaningless redundancy. Aside from the strained policy arguments of Com-
posite State Board, the fact that the United States was not permitted to join the
state court litigation significantly differentiates that case from Morros.
The second case relied upon by the majority, United States v. Penn-
sylvania,174 is equally distinguishable from the Morros case. Pennsylvania
was an appeal from the district court's grant of dismissal based on its discretion
under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Colorado River175 doctrine. The
State of Pennsylvania, in the state action, sought to enjoin the United States to
clean up certain environmental hazards.' 76 The United States unsuccessfully
attempted to have the case removed to federal court, and then brought separate
suit in federal court for injunctive relief. 177 The Third Circuit, in Pennsylvania,
based its decision on the applicability of the Declaratory Judgment Act, not any
168 Composite State Bd. Of Med. Examn'rs, 656 F.2d at 133-34.
169 Id. at 133.
170 Id. at 134-36.
171 Id. at 135-36.
172 Id. at 134-36.
173 401 U.S. 37, 44-54 (1971).
174 923 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1991).
175 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
176 United States v. Pennsylvania, 923 F.2d at 1072-73.
177 Id. at 1072-74.
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of the abstention doctrines.'77 The court reasoned that, because the district
court had more discretion with respect to declaratory relief than it does to defer
under Colorado River, the exercise of federal jurisdiction was appropriate., 79
Furthermore, while the factors considered under both the Declaratory Judgment
Act and Colorado River are similar, Colorado River requires exceptional cir-
cumstances.' 8  Therefore, the court focused solely on the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, ultimately deciding the district court should have exercised
jurisdiction. 8
In the Morros case, the United States voluntarily submitted to the state
forum. This is in stark contrast to the Pennsylvania case, wherein the United
States was an unwilling defendant in the state forum. It was only after the state
engineer denied the DOE's applications that the United States decided it
wanted to litigate in the federal court system. Further, the Pennsylvania case
dealt with Colorado River' 82 deferral as opposed to the Younger abstention
doctrine at issue in Morros. The standards under these two distinct doctrines
are nearly polar opposites. As stated in the Pennsylvania opinion, deferral
under Colorado River requires exceptional circumstances, whereas Younger
abstention is required "absent extraordinary circumstances."' 8 3 The Penn-
sylvania court never explored the central policies of comity and Our Federal-
ism associated with Younger abstention, but rather dealt solely with the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Interestingly, in the Pennsylvania court's discussion of United States v.
California, 84 the court advanced arguments that would favor abstention in
Morros.'85 The court distinguished California by stating, "the suit concerned
the division of water rights - a task the Supreme Court has noted that state
courts particularly are capable of performing." '86 Water rights were at the
basis of the Morros dispute, a topic that Pennsylvania conceded was a state
court issue. 187
The third case cited by the Morros majority as supporting the restriction of
Younger is United States v. Dicter.'88 Dicter offered very limited support for
the Morros majority. The entirety of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the
inappropriateness of Younger abstention when the United States is asserting a
federal interest consisted of a parenthetical summary of Composite State Board
after citation to that case.' 8 9 The Morros majority's inclusion of the Dicter
dicta in its analysis attributed too much weight to Dicter's brief, parenthetical
discussion of the issue.
178 Id. at 1073-74.
179 Id
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1079.
182 See supra note 14.
183 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989).
184 529 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
'85 United States v. PennsYlvania, 923 F.2d at 1077-79.
186 Id. at 1077.
187 Id.
188 198 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1999).
189 Id. at 1291.
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2. Cases Supporting Abstention in Nation v. State Controversies
Judge Hug's dissent in Morros cited the Sixth Circuit decision of United
States v. Ohio 19 in opposition to the cases relied upon by the majority.191 In
Ohio, the state tax commissioner levied tax assessments against certain con-
tractors doing work for national government entities. 192 The United States
filed for declaratory relief in the federal court.' 93 The Sixth Circuit found that
the federal government had no need for immediate access to the federal
forum.' 9 4 Rather, the court claimed the United States could intervene in the
state proceedings, even though those proceedings were administrative, rather
than judicial, proceedings.' 95 Under the principles of Younger, the court found
no reason to interfere with the ongoing state administrative proceedings.' 96
Ohio held that, although the United States is entitled to jurisdiction as a plain-
tiff in its federal courts,' 97 the exercise of such jurisdiction "must be tempered
by the judicial doctrine of abstention whenever the interest of states in adminis-
tering their own laws ...would be unnecessarily hampered ....
Morros presents a more compelling argument for abstention than Ohio,
given that the United States is the plaintiff in the state action. Similar to Ohio,
the Ninth Circuit should have stayed their hand under Younger abstention;
there is simply no need advanced by the government that would require a fed-
eral forum. The United States could have freely raised constitutional issues
directly in the state court. Ohio required the United States to intervene in the
state administrative proceeding where constitutional issues would have to wait
for appeal. The facts of the Morros case present a more compelling argument
for Younger abstention than those of Ohio, yet the majority ignored this persua-
sive holding.
The Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River provides further support
that Younger abstention should not be restricted simply because the controversy
is between a state and the national government.' 99 In that case, Colorado was
involved in litigation against the United States. The Court reviewed the district
court's decision to abstain on the authority of various abstention doctrines.
After analyzing each of the abstention doctrines, including Younger, the court
concluded that none of them were appropriate and formulated a new doctrine
for federal court deferral to state court proceedings. 2" If the Court intended to
restrict Younger abstention to those case involving a dispute between a state
and the national government, it would seem likely that they would have dis-
qualified Younger's applicability on those grounds. Rather, the court relied on
other grounds, which were inapplicable to Morros, to distinguish the Younger
190 614 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1979).
'9I United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 709 (9th Cir. 2001).
192 United States v. Ohio, 614 F.2d at 103.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 104.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 105.
197 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000).
'9' United States v. Ohio, 614 F.2d at 105.
199 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
200 Id. at 813-18.
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doctrine and determine its inapplicability in this case between the United States
and Colorado.20 '
The court in United States v. California, another state-national contro-
versy, upheld a finding of Younger abstention.20 2 The court focused primarily
on the policy argument advanced by Justice Black in Younger. California rea-
soned that "an interference of the state court proceeding is not 'automatically
granted simply on the application of the United States.' "203 Courts must also
look to the circumstances of the case to determine whether an injunction is
proper. ° 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Black captured the essence of comity and Our Federalism in his
opinion in Younger. Those notions not only form the basis for the Younger
abstention doctrine, they are the core concepts at the foundation of our govern-
mental structure. This nation's historical practice of respecting the courts of
individual states dates back to the drafting of the Constitution. The federal
government has taken great lengths to ensure that state courts are not unneces-
sarily intruded upon, including passing statutes (Anti-Injunction Act), the
Court's creation of judicial federalism, and the use of equitable restrictions on
the power of federal courts to issue injunctive relief.
The decision in Morros turns a blind eye to the notions of comity and Our
Federalism with respect to Nevada courts. Although conflict between Nevada
and the United States appears unavoidable with regard to the prospective siting
of a federal nuclear repository at Yucca Mountain, unnecessary conflict may be
avoided by permitting state courts to perform their function. Younger absten-
tion is not only appropriate, but essential in this case where the United States is
the plaintiff in both the state and federal actions. Allowing the United States to
change forums mid-process, in reaction to an adverse ruling, is dangerously
shortsighted. State court review of the state engineer's decision would allow
the United States ample opportunity to present its constitutional challenges in
the proper state forum, ultimately reviewable by the United States Supreme
Court.
The decision of Morros unnecessarily limits Younger abstention in a man-
ner inconsistent with the core concepts of comity and Our Federalism. Morros
necessarily forecloses any opportunity that issues related to Yucca Mountain
will be heard in Nevada courts as any controversy would involve the same
parties. However, the decision reaches far beyond Nevada and strips the nine
states within the Ninth Circuit of the significant protection formerly provided to
their individual court systems under Younger. Under Morros, the comity and
Our Federalism, revered by Justice Black in Younger, are tossed aside if a state
is unfortunate enough to litigate against the federal government or its agencies.
201 Id. at 816-17.
202 United States v. California, 639 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
203 Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Certified Indus., 361 F.2d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1966)).
204 United States v. California, 639 F. Supp. at 206 (quoting United States v. Certified
Indus., 361 F.2d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1966)).
[Vol. 3:592
